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Towards The Cathedral: Ancient
Sanctuary Represented In The American
Context.
MICHAEL SCOTT FEELEY*
Chorus: Here let us stand, close by the
cathedral. Here let us wait.
Are we drawn by danger? Is it the knowledge
of safety, that draws our feet
towards the cathedral? What danger can be
for us, the poor, the poor women of Canter
bury? What tribulation
with which we are not already familiar?
There is no danger
for us, and there is no safety in the cathe
dral. Some presage of an act
which our eyes are compelled to witness, has
forced our feet
towards the cathedral. We are forced to bear witness.
T.S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral 11 (1935).
INTRODUCTION
On December 29, 1170, beneath the altar of St. Benedict in Can-
terbury Cathedral, four knights of Henry II cut down Archbishop
Thomas a Becket, sometime Chancellor of the Realm and Primate of
All-England. The martyrdom of the powerful and respected prelate
in his own Cathedral by soldiers of the State rocked the western
world. As a result, the King surrendered much of his claimed powers
over the Church and he trudged in sackcloth to Becket's tomb to
* A.B. 1983, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1987, Harvard Law School; M. St. 1988,
Oxford University. The author is currently associated with the firm of Latham & Wat-
kins in Los Angeles. This article is based on a paper given to the Law Faculty of the
University of Natal, South Africa in April 1989. The author wishes to thank Professors
Tony Matthews and John Milton for the kind opportunity.
fast, beg pardon and receive scourging from eighty monks.' The
slaying of Thomas involved a threefold desecration: against the per-
son of the archbishop, against the place of sanctuary, and at the
hands of agents of the government. I contend that these three ele-
ments - person, place, governmental check - constitute the heart
of the concept of sanctuary in its various incarnations over the mil-
lennia, including contemporary American Society.
Sanctuary is the power of guardians of a defined religious site to
grant protection to one who seeks safety out of fear of life or limb.
The early Christian model, which serves as the font for Western
sanctuary practice,2 embodied the defining elements of person, place,
and secular check.3 The representatives and ministers of God and
His Church kept the sanctuary. They shielded those who sought pro-
tection based on an inherent and supernatural right to do so.4 The
site of sanctuary was dedicated to the divine, and imbued with the
protective power of the saints whose relics sanctified the spot.5
Church sanctuary stood independent of the State and defined the
limit of earthly vengeance. Through its sanctuary power, the Church
not only forced the pursuers to halt their pursuit, preventing sum-
mary retaliation against the accused, but also called the State to ob-
serve just procedures in adjudicating alleged wrongdoers.6 Thus,
Church sanctuary served as a check on violence, a reproach and aid
to a State striving to establish the rule of law, and a stimulus to due
1. D. KNOWLEs, THOMAS BECKET, 141-55 (1970).
2. Early and medieval sanctuary has attracted the attention of scholars for several
centuries. This interest has produced a vast, international body of commentary on the
subject. Two standard surveys of works on the origins of Christian sanctuary are Gabriel
le Bras, A'asile in IV DICTIONNAIRE D'HISTOIRE ET DE GEOGRAPHIC ECCLESIASTIQUES,
col. 1035-47 (1930) and Missereys, L'asile en occident in V DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT
CANoNiQUE 1089- 1104 (1934). Important European studies include A. RITTERSHUSIUS,
DE JURE ASYLORUM (1623); PIERRE TIMBAL DUCLAUX DE MARTIN, LE DROIT D'ASILE
(1939); Charles de Beurepaire, Essai sur 1'asile religleux dans l'empire romain et la
monarchie francaise, IV BIBLIOTHEQUE DE L'ECOLE DES CHARTES 351-75, 573-91
(1853), and V BIBLIOTHEQUE DE L'ECOLE DES CHARTES 151-75, 341-59 (1854); L. Fuld,
Das Asylrecht in Altertum and Mittelalter, VII ZEIrSCHRIFr FUR VERGLEICHENDE
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 102-57, 285-96 (1887); and M. SIEBOLD, DAS ASYLRECHT DER
ROMISCHEN KIRCHE MIT BESONDERER BERUCK SICHTIGUNG SEINER ENTWICKLUNG AUF
GERMANISCHEN BODEN (1930). (These sources are available at Bodelean Library, Ox-
ford University, Oxford, England).
3. Many Non-European societies also practiced sanctuary for both humanitarian
and religious reasons. For example, the Bantu and Ashanti tribes observed sanctuary in
North Africa, and Native American tribes practiced it in North America. The Aborigi-
nes of Australia and New Guinea created places of refuge as did the Hindus on the
Malibar Coast and the Kafies of Hindukush. C. URRUTIA-APARICIO. DIPLOMATIC Asy-
LUM IN LATIN AMERICA 14 (1960).
4. N.M. TRENHOLME, THE RIGHT OF SANCTUARY IN ENGLAND 94-99 (University
of Missouri Studies, Vol. I, No. 5, 1903).
5. C.H. RIGGS, JR., CRIMINAL ASYLUM IN ANGLO-SAXON LAW 26 (University of
Florida Monographs Social Sciences No. 18, Spring 1936). TRENHOLME, supra note 4, at
11-12.
6. T. MAZZINGHI, SANCTUARIES 102 (1887). TRENHOLME, supra note 4, at 95-96.
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process and fair adjudication.
This article demonstrates that the American Sanctuary Movement
contains the defining elements of historical sanctuary. Part I traces
the concept of sanctuary as it existed in ancient Israel, Greece and
Rome; early Christianity; and England. Part II presents the United
States' approach to immigration, the national ideology and character
which motivates such an approach, and the legal doctrines and legis-
lative framework which govern American refugee law and policy.
This section uses the government's response to the influx of undocu-
mented Central Americans to illustrate the political nature of Amer-
ican refugee law. Part III describes the origins and nature of the
Sanctuary Movement in the United States and the government's le-
gal action against it. An analysis of the Sanctuary Movement con-
cludes that, despite its different features and cultural locus, the
Sanctuary Movement embodies the ancient elements of person, place
and government check transformed, rather than transubstantiated,
by the American context.
I. SANCTUARY THROUGH HISTORY
A. Biblical Sanctuary
The world of ancient Israel involved the reality of blood feud and
vengeance. Homicide not only conferred but commanded the right of
the slain person's family to pursue and kill the killer.7 Biblical soci-
ety recognized such action as a private matter between families.8
This view is predicated on the blood- guilt of the pursued. The shed-
ding of human blood, even if accidental and unintentional, stained
the slayer, dishonored the victim and demanded satisfaction. The
killing polluted the offender, his family, and the community of both
slayer and slain. Originally, only the slaying of the slayer expunged
the defilement.'
In the three passages in the Bible which refer to laws of sanctu-
ary,10 its use in attempting to control blood feuds is evident. This
7. Steinmueller, J., Asylum, Cities Of, in THE NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
991 (ed. W.J. McDonald, 1967).
8. Greenberg, The Biblical Conception of Asylum, 78 J. BIBL. LIT. 125 (1959),
9. Id. at 127-28.
10. Exodus 21:12-14
Whoever strikes another man and kills him shall be put to death. But if he did
not act with intent, but they met by act of God, the slayer may flee to a place
which I will appoint for you. But if a man has the presumption to kill another
by treachery, you shall take him even from my altar to be put to death.
Id. Numbers 35:9-34.
Lex talionis approach withered under the development of three
methods to combat retaliatory killing: altar sanctuaries,11 cities of
refuge12 and expiation by the death of the high priest.1 3 A manslayer
could flee to a city of refuge. If he survived the journey, he presented
himself before a council of community elders to prove he had killed
accidentally and request protection as long as he remained within
the boundaries of the city.14 However, sanctuary was only available
to those guilty of manslaughter; murderers found no shelter. When
The Lord spoke to Moses and said, Speak to the Israelites in these words: You
are crossing the Jordan to the land of Canaan. You shall designate certain
cities to be places of refuge, in which the homicide who has killed a man by
accident may take sanctuary. These cities shall be places of refuge from the
vengeance of the dead man's next-of-kin, so that the homicide shall not be put
to death without standing his trial before the community. The cities appointed
as places of refuge shall be six in number, three east of the Jordan and three in
Canaan. These six cities shall be places of refuge, so that any man who has
taken life inadvertently, whether he be Israelite, resident alien, or temporary
settler, may take sanctuary in one of them.
Id. at 35:9-15.
If he attacks a man on the spur of the moment, not being his enemy, or hurls
a missile at him not of set purpose, or if without looking he throws a stone
capable of causing death and it hits a man, then if the man dies, provided he
was not the man's enemy and was not harming him of set purpose, the commu-
nity shall judge between the striker and the next-of-kin according to these
rules. The community shall protect the homicide from the vengeance of the
kinsman and take him back to the city of refuge where he had taken sanctuary.
He must stay there till the death of the duly anointed high priest. If the homi-
cide ever goes beyond the boundaries of the city where he has taken sanctuary,
and the next-of-kin finds him outside and kills him, then the next-of-kin shall
not be guilty of murder. The homicide must remain in the city of refuge till the
death of the high priest; after the death of the high priest he may go back to
his property. These shall be legal precedents for you for all time wherever you
live.
Id. at 35:22-30; and Deuteronomy 19:1-13.
11. Altar sanctuaries arose from ancient Canaanite tribal laws of offering tempo-
rary asylum in tents and religious sites. The references to biblical altar sanctuaries pre-
date biblical law. I. BAu, Tsns GROUND is HOLY 127-29 (1985). One school of thought
holds that as Israel expanded into Canaan, the imposition of the monotheistic worship of
Jehovah required the abolition of local altars and the development of cities of refuge.
W.G. PLAUT, B.J. BAMBERGER, W.W. HALLO, THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY
1242, 1470 (1981). Another view contends that Israel transferred the sanctuary privi-
leges of the local altar to Jehovah's altar and expanded sanctuary to encompass six Levit-
ical cities. Greenberg, City of Refugee, INTERPRETER'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE 639
(1962).
12. In Numbers 35:6-34, God commanded Moses to establish six cities of refuge
on Levitical land to which an individual who unintentionally killed another could flee for
protection. So long as the person remained within the city, he was safe. See supra note
10. Elaborate fules and traditions concerning the cities of refuge form the subject of
much Talmudic commentary. See Bau, supra note 11, at 124-27.
13. The death of the high priest released all those manslayers who resided in the
cities of refuge from their blood guilt and, concomitantly, expunged the necessity of the
slain's kinsman to kill the manslayer. Since bloodshed can only be expiated by death,
religious guilt could only be expunged in religious terms. The high priest possessed such
religious importance that his death alone acted as the acceptable payment for the resi-
dent manslayers. Greenberg, supra note 8, at 129-30, see Numbers 35:25-26.
14. Bau, supra note 11, at 125.
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the community convicted a man of murder - not manslaughter -
the penalty was death.15 Thus, Biblical sanctuary, spared the life of
the accidental slayer and provided him protection while an adjudica-
tory process determined the accused's guilt as to murder. If guilty of
intentional killing, the law handed the murderer over to death. 6
B. Greeks & Romans
Greeks and Romans both recognized the sacredness of certain
places such as altars. In Greece, sanctuary initially arose to shelter
the wretched and powerless from their pursuers.' 7 As time passed,
the Greeks allowed sanctuary to anyone fleeing to a temple in fear of
life or limb. This open admission gave rise to widespread abuse and
criminals frequently used sanctuary to escape punishment."8 The
abuses increased when sanctuary privileges were expanded to include
cemeteries, forests and cities.' 9 The Greeks eventually restored sanc-
tuary to its original function of according protection only to those
accused of involuntary crimes or those in danger of swift and cruel
vengeance.2°
Like Athens, Rome at first granted sanctuary to all criminals and
fugitives who sought its protection.2 However, this quickly changed
when sanctuary became part of the Roman system of justice.2 2 The
Romans recognized this institutional sanctuary as a temporary place
of protection, a free space, where the accused prepared a legal de-
fense and underwent investigation and judgment. 2 In a sense, sanc-
15. J. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a Dangerous
Interpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 751 (1986).
16. Id.
17. J.C. Cox, THE SANCTUARIES AND SANCTUARY SEEKERS OF MEDIEVAL ENG-
LAND 2 (1911).
18. C. URRUTIA-APARICIO, supra note 3, at 16.
19. BAU, supra note 11, at 130.
20. MAZZINGHI, supra note 6, at 108-09. C. URRUTIA-APARICIO, supra note 3, at
16.
21. Id. at 109.
22. Sanctuaries "were still to afford protection to the oppressed, not however un-
conditionally, ie., they did not operate, ipsojure, immunity from punishment and farther
prosecution, but became only a ground for a formal inquisition, terminating with a judg-
ment resting upon the ground of ascertained facts." MAZZINGHI, supra note 6, at 109-
10.
23. The institution of Sanctuary remained in Roman eyes
a holy one worthy of the Gods, but it is abundantly evident from the ordi-
nances of their Emperor, that it was considered that the privilege should sup-
port, not abrogate the law, and that the due ordering of the state and a rever-
ence for the law demanded punishment on the one hand for evil doers, and on
the other protection for the unfortunate only. In order however that an exami-
tuary traded safety from imminent harm for surrendering to the
State's judicial system.
C. Early Christians
The early Christian Church, developing within the Roman empire
yet faithful to its Hebraic and Hellenic pedigrees, asserted itself as
an independent institutional force mediating conflict and protecting
the pursued from summary punishment. As early as Constantine's
Edict of Toleration in 313 A.D., the State recognized the Church's
separate power to grant protection to those within its physical con-
fines.24 The Theodosian Code, promulgated originally in 392 A.D.
and amended over the years, explicitly referred to the sanctuary
right of the Church and reinforced ecclesiastical power with imperial
might.25 The Code defined the area which constituted the sanctu-
ary,26 regulated where fugitives stayed and how they should be-
have,27 and provided for the removal of fugitives if the clergy so de-
nation into the complaints of the fugitives might be proceeded with, the [sanc-
tuaries] were there, and were invested with unconditional authority without
other aid for their protection. He that fled in opposition to the law, found no
protection and had to succumb to the law; in spite of the privilege having been
misused, this had led to the perfection of the system ...
Id. at 110.
24. TRENHOLME, supra note 4, at 7.
25. Id.
26. The Theodosian Code, 9.45.4.
The temples of the Most High God shall be open to those persons who are
afraid. Not only do We sanction that the altars and the surrounding oratory of
the temple, which encloses the church with a barrier of four walls on the inside,
shall be set aside for the protection of those persons who take refuge, but also
the space up to the outside doors of the church, which people desiring to pray
enter first, We order to be an altar of safety for those who seek sanctuary.
Thus if there should be any intervening space within the circumference of the
walls of the temple which We have marked off and within the outer doors of
the church behind the public grounds, whether it be in the cells or in the
houses, gardens, baths, courtyards or colonnades, such space shall protect the
fugitives just as the interior of the temple does.
Id.
27. Id.
Moreover, We grant this extent of space for this purpose, namely, that it may
not be permitted that any fugitive remain or eat or sleep or spend the night in
the very temple of God or on the sacrosanct altars. The clerics themselves shall
forbid this for the sake of reverence for religion, and those who seek sanctuary
shall observe it for the sake of piety.
1. We also command that those persons who seek sanctuary shall not have
within the churches any arms at all, in the form of any weapon, either of iron
or of any other kind. For weapons are barred not only from the temples and
divine altars of the Most High God, but also from the cells, houses, gardens,
baths, courtyards, and colonnades.
2. Hereafter if any persons should flee without arms to the most holy temple of
God or to its sacrosanct altar, either anywhere else in the world or in this fair
City, they shall be prevented by the clerics themselves, without any injury to
such persons, from sleeping or from taking any food at all within the temple or
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sired.28 Anyone who forcibly removed a sanctuary seeker who was
unarmed and staying in his assigned area of the Church precincts
received death.29
Cannon law asserted the right of the Church to grant sanctuary to
whomever the Church chose, but the Emperor demanded that the
Church refuse sanctuary to certain categories of fugitives, such as
public debtors, 30 and the Church generally supported these excep-
tions."' The Church, however, developed its own rules and customs
concerning sanctuary independent from the secular government in an
effort to reduce bloodshed and promote a regulated society.32
Essentially, the clergy functioned as recognized intermediaries be-
tween pursued and pursuer to resolve the dispute without swift vio-




The clerics shall designate spaces within the ecclesiastical enclosures which
shall be sufficient for their protection and shall explain that capital punishment
has been decreed if anyone should attempt to enter forcibly and seize them. If
the fugitive should not agree to these restrictions and should not obey them,
reverence for religion must be preferred to humanity, and reckless lawlessness
must be driven from these holy places to those that We have mentioned.
3. We warn beforehand those persons who dare to enter the temples with arms
that they shall not do this. Then if they should be equipped with weapons in
any place in the church, either near the enclosure of the temple or around it or
outside it, We command that they be notified immediately and very severely by
the clerics alone, under the authority of the bishop, to lay aside their arms, and
they shall be given the assurance that they are defended by the name of reli-
gion better than by the protection of arms. But if, warned by the voice of the
Church and by the declarations of so many and so important persons, the refu-
gees should be unwilling to relinquish their weapons, then the case of Our
Clemency and of the bishops is cleared in the sight of God; armed men shall be
sent in, if the case so demands, and the refugees shall know that they will be
dragged forth, dragged away, and subjected to all kinds of misfortunes. But no
armed persons shall be dragged out from the churches without consulting the
bishop or without Our order or the order of the judges either in this fair City




Churches and places dedicated to God shall so protect accused persons who flee
to them, driven by fear, that no one shall presume to bring force and violence
to holy places in order to seize accused persons. . . . But if anyone should
attempt for any reason to drag out from a holy place any accused person at all,
the offender shall know that he will be condemned to capital punishment.
Id.
30. Id. at 9.45.1-3.
31. TRENHOLME, supra note 4, at 8-9.
32. RIGGS, supra note 5, at 23.
ishment for slaves. If a slave fled to the sanctuary out of fear of
imminent punishment, the cleric notified the slave's master and, as a
condition for releasing the slave, extracted an oath from the master
that the slave would not be harmed.33 As the power of the Church
grew and the intercessory role of clergy, particularly the bishop, in-
creased, sanctuary became a powerful force for both mediating con-
flicts and pressuring the State and citizenry to forsake quick ven-
geance and instead promulgate and observe fair procedures for
adjudicating guilt and arbitrating resolution of disputes.34
Continental Christian sanctuary rested upon two pillars: first, the
place, i.e., a holy area dedicated to God where His mysteries were
performed and sanctified by the relics of saints who lent supernatu-
ral protection to the site; second, the revered and powerful person of
the bishop and his ministers who mediated conflict and wielded such
devastating weapons as excommunication and interdict.35 The State
theoretically acknowledged the Church's independent and inherent
right to grant sanctuary. In fact, the secular rulers frequently added
royal sanctions to reinforce the Church's laws on the subject.3" The
complementary powers of Church and State formed the matrix for
developing legal procedures to protect the accused from blood ven-
geance while bringing the individual to justice. The Church did not
demand pardon for criminals, only a fair hearing and just
punishment.
D. England
In 597, Augustine arrived in England to Christianize the island,
and imported the Church's sanctuary system.37 The quickly con-
verted king acknowledged the Church's right to grant sanctuary and
decreed penalties for those who violated it.38 Two types of sanctuary
developed in England.39 One type was Church sanctuary which was
33. The Theodosian Code, 9.45.5, supra note 26.
[N]otice shall be given by the clerics whom it concerns to his master or to the
person for fear of whom the slave appears to have avoided imminent punish-
ment. The master shall grant pardon for his wrongs, and with no remnants of
anger remaining in his heart, in honor of the place and in respect for Him to
whose aid the slave has fled, he shall take the slave away.Id.
34. Cox, supra note 17, at 3-5.
35. BAu, supra note 11, at 131-33.
36. RIGGS, supra note 5, at 26-27.
37. TRENHOLME, supra note 4, at 10-11.
38. Cox, supra note 17, at 6.
39. Actually, a third type of sanctuary also existed. Certain local lords possessed
royal rights in purely secular jurisdictions. There jurisdictions remained independent
from the crown and independent from the Church. I. Thornley, The Destruction of Sanc-
tuary in TUDOR STUDIES PRESENTED TO THE BOARD OF STUDIES IN HISTORY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 183 (R.W. Seton-Watson ed. 1924).
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derived from the Church's independent power and included all sa-
cred spots that the Church designated. The second type was Royal
sanctuary which was extended by the power of the State to those
places favored by the king.4 ° These chartered sanctuaries were often
churches or religious establishments where local Church officials ad-
ministered law for the king.
The State augmented Church sanctuary by adding royal protec-
tion to the preexisting canonical grant of sanctuary.4' De jure sanc-
tuary of the king generally overlapped the de facto sanctuary of the
Church. As in ancient Israel, Church sanctuary offered a means of
controlling the Anglo-Saxon blood feud system which subjected the
offender to group or family vengeance."2 The Church's abhorrence of
unrestrained violence by either the citizen or the State motivated its
mediatory stance. The combination of the Church's widening hold on
the scattered people of the Island and the growing centralized royal
control allowed promulgation of legal measures aimed at restraining
private revenge by expanding the community's responsibility for
punishing offenders. Those who submitted to arrest and adjudication
received less severe penalties while those who resisted incurred
death; but the State, not the injured party, authorized the sentence
and execution. 3
Complex rules developed which were designed to substitute mone-
tary compensation for the right of blood satisfaction.4 Since society
assumed the injured party or group would and could retaliate, the
law sought to promote peaceful settlements by instituting house-pro-
tection rules.4 5 The Laws of Alfred allowed the pursuers to besiege
the offender for seven days but forbade violence until after a formal
request for money restitution was attempted. 6 This measure forced
a temporary truce.
Both Church and king limited the time a seeker could remain in
sanctuary. Often the permitted length of stay related directly to the
nature of the alleged crime, the importance of the particular site, or
the rank of the person administering the sanctuary (i.e., abbot,
bishop). The punishment, usually monetary, for violating sanctuary
40. Carro, supra note 15, at 754.
41. TRENHOLME, supra note 4, at 13.
42. BAu, supra note 11, at 135.
43. RIGGS, supra note 5, at 39-45.
44. Id. at 10, 29-31.
45. Id. at 17, 33-36.
46. Id. at 32.
reflected similar considerations.4 7 The purpose of sanctuary lay in
preventing retaliatory bloodletting and fostering an internally regu-
lated justice system where arbitration and due process replaced pri-
vate vengeance.
As the years passed and centralized governmental control in-
creased, Church and State clashed over control of sanctuaries and
the scope of ecclesiastic power.48 Church and State bitterly disputed
from which authority the right of sanctuary of a given place derived.
This is an important distinction. If the State grants the privilege of
sanctuary, it can also regulate and revoke it. However, if the sanctu-
ary privilege flows from the independent and separate power of the
Church, the State may not control it. In fact, this conflict played a
part in the fight between Thomas a Becket and Henry II over the
relative powers of Miter and Crown.4 9 It becomes self-evident that
when Henry VIII broke with Rome and united Church and State in
the person of the British monarch, the demise of legal sanctuary was
then possible.5 0 After the schism, sanctuary rights both spiritual and
secular flowed only from the English Sovereign and therefore, the
Crown could extinguish the privilege, which it did in 1624.51
E. Historic Function of Sanctuary
Church sanctuary is an assertion of an independent right, pre-
mised on natural and divine power, to prevent imminent harm to
whomever the Church chooses to grant protection. The Church con-
fronted the State when it was either unwilling or unable to control
the administration of criminal justice. Church sanctuary required
the alleged offender either to repent and accept legitimate punish-
ment or to present his case to a just and procedurally fair tribunal.
The sanctuary has been a catalyst for developing and upholding the
secular justice system. It forces the avenger, the State, and the pur-
sued to follow established procedures and rules in adjudicating the
alleged offense. The use of religious power to correct individual or
community failure, or the inability to render justice to the accused or
prevent his unadjudicated harm is a sacred and civic deed. Sanctu-
ary forces men and government to act rationally and justly rather
47. BAu, supra note 11, at 137-39.
48. Cox, supra note 17, at 17; Trenholme, supra note 4, at 25- 27.
49. MAZZINGM, supra note 6, at 35, referring to Henrici Knighton Leycestrenis
Chronicon, cap. xii.
50. BAU, supra note 11, at 156.
51. In the reign of James I, Parliament finally abolished all sanctuary privileges:
"And be it also enacted by the authority of this present Parliament, that no Sanctuary or
Privilege of Sanctuary shall be hereafter admitted or allowed in any case." 21 James I,
c.28 (quoted in BAU, supra note 11, at 157). For an explanation of the attempts to
abolish sanctuary beginning with Henry VIII, see Cox, supra note 17, at 320-30 and
BAU, supra note 11, at 153-57.
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than with violence and without regulation.
II. SANCTUARY AND THE UNITED STATES
The United States is a non-sectarian nation where pluralism and
fate dictate neither a pre-Reformation system of two spheres of tem-
poral government nor a post-schism union of Church and State. In
America there is no Church; there are churches composed of individ-
ual adherents who possess personal and collective rights under the
Constitution and Bill of Rights as interpreted by the courts.52 Since
James I abolished the last vestiges of sanctuary a decade before the
Pilgrims sailed, the English colonists did not transplant the legal
concept to America and it never took juridical root as part of the
inherited common law tradition. 53 Although the legal right of sanc-
tuary was not recognized in early America, the mythic founding of
the New World embodies the concept, or more properly, the ideal of
Sanctuary. Early colonists often viewed their piece of North
America as promised land, as the new Israel, as sanctuary from their
persecutors. 54
Since most of the colonies supported an established church, one of
the most difficult transitions from a collection of independent colo-
nies to a nation, involved the loss of peculiar sectarian privileges.
Many of the colonies were founded as sectarian enclaves where core-
ligionists could live in a community embodying a particular spiritual
vision. 55 The rise of dissent - or pluralism - in the individual colo-
nies, combined with the linking of the colonies through the Revolu-
tionary War, gradually forced toleration of a variety of faiths and
equalization of governmental treatment. 6 Judicial and legislative
history from the Revolution through the first quarter of the 19th
Century is fraught with conflicts surrounding the disestablishment of
each new State's preferred faith.57 Contrary to popular historical
52. See generally THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS (2d ed. 1987)
(describes some 1347 religious organizations).
53. BAU, supra note 11, at 159.
54. Id. at 158-59.
55. See generally S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIONS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
(1975).
56. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 246-
72 (1967); see also M. MARTY, RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE 34-35 (1970).
57. Massachusetts, for example, endured the struggle of Congregationalists fight-
ing to retain a privileged position both through taxation and through laws reflecting their
religious and moral beliefs. 1799 Mass. Acts 87, 88; 1811 Mass. Acts 6; Barnes v. First
Parish, 6 Mass. 401 (1810); Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. 340 (1817). See generally, J.C.
MEYER, CHURCH AND STATE IN MASSACHUSETTS (1930).
self-perception, the American principle of religious toleration and
equal treatment developed over many decades.
A. Self-image and Immigration
The tension between America's self-image and her actual policies
appears clearly in the area of immigration law. America maintains
simultaneously her self-conception as a land open to all, and her self-
interested desire to preserve the patrimony for those who are already
within the national community."8 For over two centuries, America
has not only thought of herself, but fostered her reputation, as the
true democracy where all are welcome and achievement is limited
only by individual ability and drive. While the possibilities and indi-
vidual freedoms of the United States are unparalleled, the myth of
America as the land of equal opportunity and unlimited promise
overlooks much of the reality - not the least of which is the formi-
dable hurdle of entry into the country.59 From the Alien Act of
179860 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,61 through the numer-
ical and national origin limits of the 20th century, 2 U.S. policy grew
to regulate jealously who and how many could immigrate.
The power to admit and exclude is both vital and necessary. Fun-
damentally, a nation is the composite of its citizens, some of whom it
admits from other countries. Since the government finds it difficult
to regulate reproduction, it places its energies in scrutinizing the for-
eign-born seeking entry. In contrast to the rest of American law,
governmental power is at its greatest and individual entitlement is at
its lowest in the area of immigration law.6 3 The U.S. Supreme Court
has long acknowledged border regulation as the quintessential func-
tion of sovereignty and has repeatedly recognized the plenary power
of Congress and President to exclude aliens.64 Although there are
58. Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 1289
(1983).
59. From the birth of the nation until the last quarter of the 19th century, national
policy generally encouraged immigration in order to settle the vast expanses of the coun-
try. As the economy shifted from agrarian to industrial, exclusionary sentiment grew and
barriers to immigration arose. P. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1984).
60. Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570. This first federal immigration law
permitted the President to deport any person he determined to be a threat to peace and
safety.
61. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Act of December 17,
1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. Fear of The Yellow Peril begat this first racially exclusion-
ary federal immigration law.
62. The quota system, designed to protect a certain racial and ethnic makeup of
the country, began with the Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5. For a
history of American immigration law and policy, see BAU, supra note 11, at 40-48.
63. Schuck, supra note 59, at 1.
64. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892); Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); Oceanic Steam Navigation v.
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signs of change, 5 currently and historically immigration is extracon-
stitutional and virtually non-reviewable.66 Hence, judicial deference
to agency, legislative and executive decisions on these questions is
nearly absolute.67
The classic model upon which the judicial doctrine rests holds that
the alien remains outside the national community and the State owes
nothing to someone with whom the country has not agreed freely to
enter into a legal relationship involving reciprocal rights and duties.
Sovereignty means that the nation cannot be forced against its will
to enter into a continuing relationship with an unwelcome intruder.68
Furthermore, since the alien is not an accepted member of the na-
tional community - often outside the geographic boundaries of the
United States when applying for admission - constitutionally man-
dated procedures and protections may not apply in any significant
manner.
69
The inscription on the Statute of Liberty has taken on totemic
significance. It proclaims "Give me your tired, your poor,/ your hud-
dled masses yearning to breathe free,/ The wretched refuse of your
teeming shore./ Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me." 70 Yet
with millions of such people yearly attempting to accept the invita-
tion, choices must be made. Such decisions are inevitably political,
especially when the executive branch enjoys broad discretion in de-
ciding who may enter. This is particularly problematic when an un-
documented alien is already in the country and seeks to remain
within the United States through application for political asylum or
through the withholding of a deportation order.71 It was the Reagan
Administration's response to these legal attempts by Central Ameri-
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 340 (1909); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 212 (1953); and Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
65. For an explanation and analysis of the structural and ideological changes in
motion, see Schuck, supra note 59, at 34- 73.
66. Id. at 18.
67. Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, supra note 58, at 1311-12.
68. Schuck, supra note 59, at 30.
69. See Shaughnessy v. United States, ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). The
government has almost unlimited power to deny an alien admission to the country on
grounds which would not pass Constitutional muster if applied to a U.S. citizen. For
example, the courts have upheld refusal of admission based on national origin in Faustino
v. INS, 432 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1970); on gender and illegitimacy in Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787 (1970); and political ideology in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
70. The inscription on the statute of liberty is taken from the poem, "The New
Colossus," which was written by Emma Lazarus. The poem is reprinted in its entirety in:
8 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 875 (WORLD BOOK, INC. 1990).
71. See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
can immigrants which sparked the Sanctuary Movement. 2
B. The Structure of American Refugee and Asylum Law
Congress passed the Refugee Act of 198073 (the "INA") in an
effort to sort out the patchwork of laws woven over the years in re-
sponse to sporadic refugee crises ranging from the World Wars to
the Cambodian boat people. 4 The INA established a two-tiered sys-
tem consisting of a regular refugee flow determined annually by the
President in consultation with Congress75 and an emergency proce-
dure for unforeseen humanitarian needs based on the President's dis-
cretionary power. 76 The ideologic (i.e., anticommunist) and geo-
graphic (i.e., racial) bias of the pre-1980 immigration laws"
theoretically gave way to the definition of refugee adopted by the
1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees78 and the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 79 A refugee is one who
flees his or her country as a result of "persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion."80 This defini-
tion is central to determining refugee status or to granting asylum.
A distinction exists between a refugee and an asylee. A refugee is
an individual who meets the statutory definition of a well-founded
fear of persecution, resides both outside the United States and
outside his own country when applying for admission, and is admit-
ted as a non-quota immigrant.81 An asylee is a person already within
the United States who first meets the statutory definition of refugee
and then is granted asylum at the discretion of the Attorney General
72. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
73. Act of Mar. 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1982) and referred to as the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act) [hereinafter the "INA"]. See Martin, The Refugee Act of
1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MIcH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 102 (1982).
74. Comment, Ecumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States Ref-
ugee Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 493, 522 (1986) [hereinafter "The Sanctuary
Movement"]. A full exposition of the legislative history of the INA appears in Anker &
Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9 (1981).
75. INA § 207(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2) (1982).
76. Id. § 207(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b).
77. Leibowitz, The Refugee Act of 1980: Problems and Congressional Concerns,
467 ANNALS 163, 166 (1983).
78. U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter "1951 Convention"].
79. U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature, Janu-
ary 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter "1967
Protocol"].
80. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982).
81. Schmidt, Refuge in the United States: The Sanctuary Movement Should Use
the Legal System, 15 HOrSTRA L. REv. 79, 79-80 (1986).
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of the United States.82 Since statistically Central Americans - the
main focus of the Sanctuary Movement's efforts - have virtually no
chance to receive refugee status by applying outside the United
States,"3 most applications to remain in America are from aliens who
have crossed illegally into the country and have been apprehended
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the "INS").
To forestall deportation, apprehended aliens may invoke two ave-
nues provided in the INA to qualify the applicant to legally remain
in the United States: withholding of deportation and political asy-
lum. Both procedures are predicated on the INA's adoption of the
international law principle of "non-refoulement". Thus, the INA for-
bids deportation of an alien to a country where the Attorney General
determines that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened due
to his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.84 The applicant must meet the ob-
jective test of proving somewhat less than "whether it is more likely
than not" that the alien would be subject to persecution. 5 The bur-
den of proof is weighty, particularly in light of the need for corrobo-
rative evidence and the skepticism with which the applicant's testi-
mony is often viewed. 88 If the applicant demonstrates danger to life
or limb if forcibly returned to his country, then U.S. law requires
that he not be sent to the country in question. However, the INS
may deport the applicant to a third country. A withholding of depor-
tation does not guarantee that the applicant will be allowed to stay
in America, it only prevents deportation to a persecuting nation.8 7
82. Id. at 81-82.
83. Id. at 80-81.
84. INA § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1). "Non-refoulement" derives from the
French verb refouler which means "to send back." The international legal principle of
non-refoulement was established first in the 1933 Convention Relating to the Interna-
tional Status of Refugees and has constituted a central provision of numerous subsequent
international instruments including the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. For an ex-
planation and analysis of the place of non-refoulement in international instruments, see
BAU, supra note 11, at 48-58.
85. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987). The standard of proof to
be applied has proved a focus of much legal commentary. See, e.g., Healy, The Alien's
Burden of Proof Under Section 243(h): How Clear is Clear Probability?, 17 IND. L. REV.
581 (1984); Dodge, Eligibility for Withholding of Deportation: The Alien's Burden
Under the 1980 Refugee Act, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1193 (1983); Comment, Political
Asylum and Withholding of Deportation: Defining the Appropriate Standard of Proof
Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171 (1983); and Comment,
Cardoza-Fonseca: Reconciling the Standard of Proof for Grant of Asylum and With-
holding of Deportation, GEO. IMmI. L.J. 81 (1985).
86. The Sanctuary Movement, supra note 74, at 532-35.
87. Schmidt, supra note 81, at 86. See Walai v. INS, 552 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y.
Political asylum on the other hand, permits the alien to remain in
the United States. The applicant must first meet the refugee defini-
tion of "well-founded fear of persecution." Although the standard
requires objective proof of a reasonable basis for the fear, the subjec-
tive fear, of the person must be considered.88 If the alien is deter-
mined to be a refugee, the Attorney General wields the discretionary
power to admit or exclude him or her.89
The shear magnitude of the problem - an estimated half a mil-
lion undocumented aliens cross the border each year - has created
a huge backlog in asylum applications.9 The overwhelming numbers
have led to objectionable INS practices such as holding aliens in
crowded and unsanitary detention centers, bullying them into signing
voluntary departure waivers, and not informing them of the legal
avenues available. 91 Recent court cases against the INS have forced
some procedural changes.92 However, while structural and ideologi-
cal forces have begun to weaken the classical understanding of aliens
as having no rights under the Constitution, 3 usually it is still only a
matter of time before an applicant is deported.
Salvadorans and Guatemalans receive almost blanket denial of
their asylum applications.94 The government justifies this result by
considering the vast majority of the applicants to be economic mi-
grants, not political ones.95 To receive asylum or a withholding from
deportation order, the applicant must be deemed a refugee and the
government consistently finds the Salvadoran or Guatemalan appli-
cant to have no "well-founded fear of persecution" based on race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion.96 The random nature of the violence and human
rights abuses in Salvador and Guatemala renders it virtually impos-
sible to label the action as persecution incurred due to one of the
aforementioned statutory categories. Fleeing military unrest or eco-
nomic disaster does not count; a generalized climate of fear and vio-
lence is insufficient.9 It must be persecution of the person due to one
1982) and Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1491 (9th Cir. 1986).
88. The Sanctuary Movement, supra note 74, at 533.
89. INA § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1982); 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(0(2) (1987).
90. Simpson, The Immigration Reform and Control Act: Immigration Policy and
the National Interest, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 147, 157 (1984).
91. MAcEOIN & RILEY, No PROMISED LAND: AMERICAN REFUGEE POLICY AND
THE RULE oF LAW (1982).
92. Blum, The Ninth Circuit and the Protection of Asylum Seekers Since the Pas-
sage of the Refugee Act of 1980, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 327 (1986).
93. Schuck, supra note 59, at 34-53.
94. BAu, supra note 11, at 60.
95. Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Re-
public of France: Lessons for the United States, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 183, 191 (1984).
96. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text for statistical support.
97. See, e.g., Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986); Zepeda-
Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1984); Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692
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of the enumerated reasons and it is very difficult to satisfy the gov-
ernment that the applicant meets the requisite burdens of proof.98
A more honest rational for the disparity in asylum approvals re-
lates to the ultimately political nature of the keeper of the gate. The
executive branch of government is vested with enormous power in
controlling immigration policy. Such power functions as a formida-
ble weapon in the foreign relations arena.99 Historically, the presi-
dency, through the Attorney General and the State Department, has
used its discretion to favor asylum seekers from communist countries
or other nations whose governments expressed hostility to America.
There, a grant of asylum is a judgment about the country or regime
from which the applicant fled. Between 1968 and 1980, the executive
branch granted asylum to applicants from communist countries over
non- communist countries by a ratio of almost 80 to 1.100
The results have changed little since the Refugee Act of 1980 al-
legedly erased ideological considerations. In 1983, 78% of the Rus-
sians, 64 % of the Ethiopians and 53 % of the Afghans who applied
received asylum as compared to 3 % of Salvadorans and 2% of
Guatemalans. 1 In 1985, 73 % of the Libyans, 59 % of the Romani-
ans and 57% of the Czech applicants were granted asylum against
3 % of the Salvadorans and 1 % of the Guatemalans. 102 In 1987,
84 % of the Nicaraguans, 3.6 % of the Salvadorans and 3.8 % of the
Guatemalans who applied received asylum.1 03 These figures reflect
major U.S. foreign policy concerns in the years in question.
It is to be expected that applicants from countries which the
United States opposes, often on sound ideologic and practical
grounds, should merit political' asylum. The converse, however, is
F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1982); and Sanchez v. INS, 707 F.2d 1523, 1527-28 (D.C. Cir.
1983). Although the Senate version of the INA included persons "displaced by military
or civil disturbance or uprooted because of arbitrary detention" in its definition of refu-
gee, S. 643, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 201 (1979), that the final legislation deliberately
deleted this language has been taken as evidence of clear congressional intent not to
provide refugee status to aliens escaping national unrest, even when violent and
widespread.
98. The Sanctuary Movement, supra note 74, at 532-39.
99. Whelan, Principles of U.S. Immigration Policy, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 447,
479-80 (1983).
100. Note, The Underground Railroad and the Santuary Movement: A Compari-
son of History, Litigation and Values, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.. 1429, 1448 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter "The Underground Railroad").
101. Id.
102. The Sanctuary Movement, supra note 74, at 496-97.
103. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SER-
VICE 57 (1987).
also true. Nations which the United States support but which reek of
oppression and human rights violations nonetheless are treated dif-
ferently due to foreign policy considerations."' It would not play
well to the electorate for the government to champion morally offen-
sive regimes. The Reagan and Bush Administrations have asserted
that the United States has a vested interest in supporting the govern-
ments in El Salvador and Guatemala.105 To admit that many of the
asylum applicants from those countries have a well-founded fear of
persecution from their own government undermines American diplo-
matic strategy.10 6 In fact, congressionally authorized aid is tied to an
assessment of the human rights situation in each recipient country.
In order to continue giving aid to those countries, the United States
government must characterize the undocumented aliens as economic
migrants or people simply seeking a better life outside of their own
chaotic country. Both are legitimate reasons for wanting to live in
the United States, but neither is good enough to win admission to
the limited places available.
10 7
In addition to foreign policy considerations, domestic pressures
also militate for more severe treatment of Central American undocu-
mented immigrants. With the thousands of such aliens flooding into
the United States each year, the popular and accurate perception,
particularly of those citizens in the southwestern states, is that the
U.S. has lost control of its borders.10 8 Many believe that the influx
depresses wages and employment conditions, displaces jobs in certain
geographic areas and dries up work usually done by certain social
groups, and adds more people to be cared for by taxpayers.10 9 Others
counter these charges by asserting that the aliens perform tasks no
one else will do, avoid public assistance out of fear of deportation,
and are vital in such industries as agriculture.110 The widespread
flouting of the laws - illegal immigration, alien smuggling opera-
tions, substandard benefits and working conditions for aliens, etc. -
has a pernicious effect on American society. 1 To remedy the prob-
lem, all parties agree that the laws must be stringently enforced; the
disagreement rests on what the laws should be and how they should
be interpreted.
104. See Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled
Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243, 253-54 (1984).
105. Roming, Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the
United States, 47 U. PrrT. L. REV. 295, 316 (1985).
106. Id. at 318-19.
107. Id. at 324-26.
108. Smith, Immigration Law Reform: Proposals in the 98th Congress, 21 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 7, 8 (1983).
109. Simpson, supra note 90, at 152-56.
110. Schuck, supra note 59, at 37.
111. Simpson, supra note 90, at 154.
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III. THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. Sanctuary Movement sprang into being in response to
personal encounters by American citizens with Central Americans
stumbling across the Mexican border into Arizona, New Mexico,
California and Texas. 1 2 The numbers of these Central Americans
jumped dramatically as the situation in Central America worsened
at the end of the 1970s."1 3 In 1980, two seminal events focused the
American religious community on the chaos and violence in El Sal-
vador: first, the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero of San
Salvador while saying Mass114 and second, the rape and murder of
four American Catholic missionaries by National Guardsmen. 15
Heightened awareness of the violence in Central America com-
bined with the flood of Central Americans into the American border
towns prompted religious communities to provide food, clothing,
shelter, medical care and legal assistance to the aliens.116 The Cen-
tral Americans recounted graphic stories of their suffering in their
native countries, subsequent hazardous journeys to the U.S., and the
horrors they believed awaited them at home.1 7 Such personal inter-
action galvanized the religious community, mostly made up of main-
stream, middleclass Americans, to assist the aliens to remain in the
U.S. 118
At first, church workers simply brought the aliens to the INS to
apply for withholding from deportation and political asylum. The
church workers assumed that the legal system would recognize that
112. A. CRITTENDON, SANCTUARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN CONSCIENCE AND LAW
IN COLLISION XV (1988). Throughout her book, Crittendon details the personal en-
counters between various U.S. citizens and Central Americans which inspired individuals
to begin assisting the undocumented aliens.
113. Jorstad, Sanctuary for Refugees: A Statement on Public Policy, THE CHRIS-
TIAN CENTURY, March 14, 1984, at 15.
114. Id. at 16-17. Archbishop Romero headed the Roman Catholic Church in El
Salvador. An outspoken critic of the violence in the country, Romero was shot through
the heart while celebrating Mass on March 24, 1980.
115. Posner & Greathead, Justice in El Salvador: A Report by the Lawyers Com-
mittee for International Human Rights on the Investigation into the Killing of Four
U.S. Churchwomen, 14 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 191 (1982-83).
116. R. GOLDEN & M. MCCONNELL, SANCTUARY: THE NEW UNDERGOUND RAIL-
ROAD 14 (1986).
117. Id. Golden and McConnell provide numerous examples throughout their book
of the terrible ordeals individual Central Americans endured.
118. See, e.g., Volsky, U.S. Churches Offer Sanctuary to Aliens Facing Deporta-
tion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1983, § A, at 1, col. 1; Goldman, Churches Becoming Home to
Central American Exiles, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1984, § 4, at 9, col. 1; Reinhold,
Churches and U.S. Clash on Alien Sanctuary, N.Y. Times, Jun. 28, 1984, § A, at 1, col.
4.
the Central Americans had a well-founded fear of persecution enti-
tling them to reside in the States.119 An ecumenical religious com-
munity in Arizona put up the bail money to essentially ransom hun-
dreds of Central Americans held in deplorable detention centers.120
In spite of an energetic legal advocacy program, the INS deported
Salvadorans and Guatemalans in droves. Of the fifty-five hundred
Salvadorans who applied for political asylum in 1981 and 1982, only
two received it.' 2 ' The futility of applying to the INS, combined with
expanding personal contact with scarred aliens and the realization
that their legal efforts were actually facilitating deportation, caused
the volunteers to adopt a new strategy of "evasive services, sanctuary
and an extensive underground railroad;" and prompted the loosely
affiliated religious communities to band together officially as the
Sanctuary Movement. 22
On March 24, 1982 - the second anniversary of the assassination
of Archbishop Romero - Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson,
Arizona officially declared itself a sanctuary for Central Americans
fleeing violence in their native lands.123 Since then, several hundred
churches have openly declared themselves sanctuaries. 24 The loosely
organized movement shepherds a small but symbolic number of Cen-
tral Americans across the Mexican border clandestinely, provides
physical and spiritual assistance to many who have already entered
the country, and places serve them with sponsoring congregations
throughout the country. 25 An important part of the Movement in-
volves testimony before congregations by the Central Americans on
the conditions of their home lands and what specific events prompted
them to flee. 128
Although the number of Central Americans actually brought
across the border is minuscule compared to the overall number of
119. Crittendon details two accounts in her book, where church workers attempted
to go through official procedures to obtain asylum for individual refugees, which only
resulted in the rapid deportation of those refugees. CRITrENDON, supra note 112, at 52-
54, 85-86.
120. Colbert, The Motion In Limine: Trial Without Jury, A Government's
Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 33 (1986).
121. Id. at 34.
122. GOLDEN & Mc CONNELL, supra note 116, at 41-48. It is inaccurate to view
the Sanctuary Movement as a monolithic, homogenous group. The original affiliates, the
"Tucson School," arose spontaneously from religious individuals banning together to aid
the Central American aliens. A second group of adherents, the "Chicago School," en-
tered the scene with a focused political agenda of aiding Central American aliens as part
of the larger goal of changing U.S. policy in Central America. See CRITTENDON, supra
note 112, at 88-93, 202-25. This component of the Movement raises further religio-politi-
cal issues beyond this article's scope. The Sanctuary Movement discussed herein, there-
fore, refers to the Tuscon School.
123. BAU, supra note 11, at 10.
124. Villarruel, "The Underground Railroad," supra note 100, at 1433.
125. See BAU, supra note 11, at 13.
126. GOLDEN & MC CONNELL, supra note 116, at 2-3.
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aliens seeking refugee, and the amount of aliens actually assisted in
any capacity is only around 2000 to 3000 to date, 12 7 the Sanctuary
Movement's impact is greater than these numbers indicate. The
Sanctuary Movement is vocal: Press conferences are held; conven-
tions meet; open letters are sent to the government.
The government initially ignored the activities of the manage-
ment.329 However, this changed dramatically as the numbers of
Sanctuary workers swelled and the publicity about the plight of the
aliens and the atrocities committed in their native lands ignited a
debate over both U.S. Central American policy and the treatment of
undocumented aliens. The government faced a Hobson's dilemma: to
ignore the Sanctuary Movement's activities would hold the law in
derision and discredit American immigration and foreign policy, yet
to invade churches and prosecute religious workers for humanitarian
activity prophesied moral and political debacle. 129
The INS launched a full scale undercover operation in 1983 rely-
ing heavily on paid informants to infiltrate the Sanctuary Movement
posing as volunteers.3 0 Ironically, the operation was code named So-
journer after the Civil War African-American who led thousands of
slaves escaping from the Confederate states to the Northern free
states by means of the so-called "underground railroad" made up
principally of religious volunteers.131 The informants attended and
taped Bible Studies, religious meetings and gatherings with aliens;
and participated in transporting the aliens into and throughout the
country. 132 As a result of the operation, eleven church workers, in-
cluding two Catholic priests, a Catholic nun, and a Presbyterian
minister in Arizona, were indicted on charges of smuggling, harbor-
ing and transporting illegal aliens, and conspiracy. 133 This indict-
127. CRITTENDON, supra note 112, at 245. The INS estimates that since 1982 the
Sanctuary Movement may have helped between 2000 and 3000 illegal aliens out of an
estimated 500,000 who cross into the United States through Mexico each year.
128. Helton, "The Sanctuary Movement," supra note 74, at 554.
129. BAU, supra note 11, at 87-89.
130. CRITTENDON, supra note 112, at 114.
131. The African-American Civil War heroine was named Sojourner Truth. B.
HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMEN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981).
132. Complaint, The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) Inc. v. United States, No. CIV
86-0072 PHXCLH (D. Ariz. 1986).
133. BAU, supra note 11, at 83-85. The defendants were charged under 8 U.S.C.
Section 371 with engaging in a conspiracy to violate 8 U.S.C. Section 1324 and 8 U.S.C.
Section 1325. Section 1324(a) provides:
(1) Any person who -
(A) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to bring to
the United States in any manner whatsoever such person at a place other
ment led to the watershed case of United States v. Aguilar.134
In Aguilar, the prosecution obtained an astonishing procedural
ruling which effectively gutted the Sanctuary worker's defense. The
court granted the government's motion in limine to preclude the de-
than a designated port of entry or place other than as designated by the
Commissioner, regardless of whether such alien has received prior official
authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States and regard-
less of any future official action which may be taken with respect to such
alien;
(B) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to,
entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, transports, or
moves or attempts to transport or move such alien within the United
States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such
violation of law;
(C) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact than an alien has come to,
entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals,
harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or
shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or
any means of transportation; or
(D) encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the
United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such com-
ig to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law,
shall be fined in accordance with title 18, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both, for each alien in respect to whom any violation of this subsec-
tion occurs.
(2) Any person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien
has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the
United States, brings to or attempts to bring to the United States in any man-
ner whatsoever, such alien, regardless of any official action which may later be
taken with respect to such alien shall, for each transaction which may later be
taken with respect to such alien shall, for each transaction constituting a viola-
tion of this paragraph, regardless of the number of aliens involved -
(A) be fined in accordance with title 18, or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both; or
(B) in the case of-
(i) a second or subsequent offense,
(ii) an offense done for the purpose of commercial advantage or
private financial gain, or
(iii) an offense in which the alien is not upon arrival immediately
brought and presented to an appropriate immigration officer at a
designated port of entry,
be fined in accordance with title 18, or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1988).
Section 1325(a) provides:
Any alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by
immigration officers, or (3) obtains entry to the United States by a willfully
false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact,
shall, for the first commission of any such offenses, be guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction thereof be punished by imprisonment for not more than
six months, or by a fine of not more than $500, or by both, and for a subse-
quent commission of any such offenses shall be guilty of a felony and upon
conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two
years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988).
134. U.S. v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989).
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fendant's four central defenses as irrelevant and prejudicial. 135 First,
the defendants argued, that their activities were lawful under inter-
national and domestic law because the Central Americans were refu-
gees entitled to certain protections such as nonrefoulement. Second,
even if their activities were not deemed lawful, the defendants ar-
gued that they lacked the requisite criminal intent because it was
reasonable to believe that the aliens were within the statutory defini-
tion of refugee. Third, the defendants argued that the First Amend-
ment right to free exercise of religion protected their conduct.
Fourth, it was argued that necessity justified any alleged criminal
violations since the alternative was to allow the aliens to be deported
to probable death.1"6 By precluding these four essential defenses
from the start, the court eviscerated the Sanctuary workers' case.
The trial then became merely a question of whether the defendants
knowingly harbored and transported undocumented aliens. On May
1, 1986, eight of the defendants were found guilty.'3 The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions on March 30, 1989.138
There are two legal arguments at the core of the Movement's solu-
tion."39 First, the Movement believes that the undocumented Central
American aliens are refugees whom the government is forbidden by
international and domestic law to deport. Refugee is a de facto not
de jure status. Proponents of the sanctuary assert that the govern-
ment recognizes an alien to be a refugee; it does not confer the sta-
tus. One is either a refugee or one is not, independent of any official
ruling. 40 The Sanctuary defendants aver that they reasonably be-
lieved these Central Americans to be refugees, i.e., having a well-
founded fear of persecution and hence protected by the ban on de-
portation. The issue returns elliptically to the determination of what
the situation in Central America really is and who makes that judg-
ment. The executive branch claims itself to be the sole determiner of
the situation, and asserts that if Congress thought otherwise, it could
pass legislation. The courts, with their historic deference to the exec-
utive branch in such matters, generally agree.' 4'
135. For an analysis of the motion in limine, see Colbert, supra note 118, at 48-78.
136. Id. at 56.
137. Crittendon, supra note 112, at 322-23.
138. 871 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1989).
139. For an in-depth discussion of the Aguilar defenses, see Helton, The Sanctu-
ary Movement, supra note 74, at 560-81.
140. Courts have rejected this view in United States v. Periera- Pineda, 721 F.2d
137, 139-40 (5th Cir. 1983) and U.S. v. Merlet, 794 F.2d 950, 954-57 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1603 (1987).
141. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
A second central tenet of the Sanctuary argument is the assertion
that the First Amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion 42
protects their religiously-motivated humanitarian assistance to suf-
fering strangers.143 The Movement has continually proclaimed its
basis as praxis required of a community of faith. Sanctuary workers
claim to act as part of a religious community living out their service
to the pursued alien.4
The government, as well as some sanctuary proponents, classifies
the Sanctuary Movement as a part of the tradition of civil disobedi-
ence, not a reassertion of historic sanctuary. It contends that historic
sanctuary was born out of societies with less well-developed legal
systems and plagued by uncontrolled private vengeance codes. Fur-
thermore, the State as a democracy recognizes no church as consti-
tuting an independent source of political government in America. 145
Therefore, no matter how religiously motivated the members of the
Sanctuary Movement may be, they are civil dissenters to be
respected for their convictions but sanctioned for their actions.
Civil disobedience is an honored tradition in the United States.
Moral opposition, based on theological or ethical belief, to what is
perceived as unjust law or governmental policy is an integral part of
the American political philosophy. 146 Society, however, cannot allow
each individual to select which laws he will and will not obey. De-
mocracy expects compliance even with laws and regulations with
which the individual disagrees because the political compact presup-
poses the overall fairness of the law-making process and treatment of
the individual. 47
The distinction between the self-interested lawbreaker and the
civil dissenter rests on fundamental loyalty to the system of laws and
government comprising the American model. A distinguishing mark
of American civil disobedience is the acceptance of punishment. The
dissenter recognizes what a particular law declares, determines that
it is wrong to the degree that he cannot acquiesce to it, and publicly
defies it. Since the law qua law is supreme - even when morally
offensive - the dissenter accepts the sanctions imposed on her by
virtue of the law. He or she attests both to the injustice of the com-
plained of law and to his recognition of the authority of the legal
142. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const. Amend I. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution made the free exercise clause applicable to the States.
143. The Sanctuary Movement, supra note 74, at 576.
144. BAU, supra note 11, at 12-16.
145. Schmidt, supra note 81, at 94-96.
146. Comment, Civil Disobedience and the First Amendment, 32 UCLA L. REV.
904 (1985).
147. A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 47-55 (1968).
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system.1 48 The Civil Rights movement in the United States illus-
trates this point. Martin Luther King's nonviolent civil disobedience
brought imprisonment and called attention to unjust or unenforced
laws.149 The American democratic tradition celebrates individuals
whose principles compel them to disobey the law and accept the con-
sequences of their actions.
Sanctuary in the American democratic context seems a far cry
from historical sanctuary. Indeed, the government argues that the
use of the title for the current Movement is a misnomer, an attempt
to claim an outmoded, unnecessary and non-American concept as a
basis for illegal activity. The INS holds that the Sanctuary Move-
ment does not resemble biblical sanctuary which protected against
bloodjustice in a less developed legal system or Western sanctuary
which protected criminals from summary violence but still allowed
for their punishment. 150 In America's well-developed legal system,
grounded on Constitutional rights and due process, the government
contends historical sanctuary has no place.'51
The question remains, however, whether historic sanctuary is re-
ally obsolete and inapplicable within the American democratic
framework or whether the essential elements of historic sanctuary
can be refracted through the American prism for representation in
this political context. The Sanctuary Movement differs from historic
sanctuary in several respects, but these differences do not affect the
three essential elements of sanctuary: person, place and government
check. A first difference is that the Sanctuary workers actively seek
aliens to transport and harbor. The churches do not wait for the
alien to come to them, rather the churches go out offering sanctuary.
The INS has stated that it is concerned with the smuggling of un-
documented aliens across the border rather than the shelter and as-
sistance accorded a small number of aliens once they are in the
country.' 52 Professional smugglers, called coyotes, bring in the lion's
share of Central Americans.53 These coyotes make large profits, fre-
quently subject the aliens to terrible conditions, and often have ties
to drug importers. The statute under which the Sanctuary workers
were prosecuted was drafted to curtail coyotes.' The Sanctuary
148. Id. at 66-67.
149. Id. at 67-68.
150. Schmidt, supra note 81, at 94-100.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 98-99.
153. CRITTENDON, supra note 112, at 140.
154. The Sanctuary Movement, supra note 74, at 562.
workers raise the defense that the statute was not meant to apply to
them, but to mercenary coyotes. 15 5 A relatively few Sanctuary work-
ers actually bring a small number of Central Americans across the
border into the country.156 The Sanctuary Movement spends the vast
bulk of its time and resources assisting, sheltering and placing aliens
once they are in the United States.
A second difference between the Sanctuary Movement and his-
toric sanctuary is that there is no limit on the length of time an alien
may remain in sanctuary. This is not, however, a material distinc-
tion. Temporal limits to sanctuary have always been arbitrary. The
Church's decision to dispense and condition sanctuary is simply a
voluntary decision on when and how to exercise its power. The num-
ber of days may be lengthened, shortened, or eliminated according to
the prescription of the Church.
Third and most importantly, the State does not recognize the
churches affording sanctuary as having the legal right to do so. As
previously discussed, the colonial history, American revolution, and
subsequent Constitutional democracy acknowledged no power of the
then disestablished churches to grant sanctuary.5 7 The Constitution,
however, guarantees the free exercise of religion to all citizens. The
Sanctuary workers claim that they are compelled by religious beliefs
to provide food, clothing, shelter and assistance to suffering stran-
gers; in short, to fulfill the ancient mission of the Church to practice
corporal works of mercy.' 58 The INS does not quarrel with such hu-
manitarian aid; it quarrels with the undocumented condition of the
recipient.
American jurisprudence accords great respect for the free exercise
of religion. When free exercise clashes with another right or impor-
tant interest, the Supreme Court has fashioned a two-part test. First,
the court determines if the religious motivation is sincere, not
whether the action is central to the faith and certainly not if it is a
valid belief.159 Second, the court decides if the governmental interest
outweighs the free exercise right and if the government could
achieve its interest by a less restrictive means than infringing on free
exercise. 160
It is argued that the government's important interest in protecting
U.S. borders and enforcing congressionally-authorized immigration
law trumps the individual and congregational interest in transporting
155. BAU, supra note 11, at 108-09.
156. CRITTENDON, supra note 112, at 140.
157. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
158. BAU, supra note 11, at 12-16.
159. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 714-16 (1981).
160. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).
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and harboring undocumented aliens out of religious conviction.' 61 To
make an exception for religiously motivated workers raises establish-
ment clause issues, i.e., the law cannot favor religion over non-reli-
gion.'6 2 Rather than delve into the serpentine terrain of religious
freedom, it is sufficient to say that the State may be able or may be
forced to recognize in some fashion the religiously-based right to ac-
cord sanctuary - however labeled - in the American democratic
system.
In spite of these three differences, the Sanctuary Movement em-
bodies the essentials of historic sanctuary albeit transposed into an
American key. As illustrated by the Becket martyrdom, three distin-
guishing marks of historic sanctuary are person, place and govern-
mental check. These elements are hallmarks of the Sanctuary Move-
ment as well.
Historic sanctuary was possible because the State respected the
presence of the recognized representatives of God and Church. This
respect arose from the power of the ecclesiastical office and its au-
thority in the community. In the American context, Sanctuary pro-
ponents, particularly the ordained ministers and religious workers,
also exert an authority respected by the State, since spiritual leaders
have followings and are generally perceived as having moral power.
The weapons of interdict and excommunication may not deter the
United States government, but religious condemnation disturbs
American politicians. Sanctuary workers act within and on behalf of
religious communities. They are actively supported by congregations
of generally law-abiding, middleclass citizens. This gives the govern-
ment pause, for in a democracy, a mobilized and motivated electo-
rate is an important force.
Furthermore, the State must always be aware whenever religious
beliefs, particularly of powerful communities, are involved. Individ-
ual religious leaders and united adherents command governmental
attention.'6 3 The Constitutional basis for religious freedoms endows
the Sanctuary Movement with augmented protection; sensitivity to
religious claims forces the State to approach Sanctuary workers
more gingerly. In practical terms, the religious status, motivation
and membership of the person have significance in the government's
161. The Sanctuary Movement, supra note 74, at 580.
162. Carto, supra note 15, at 773-77.
163. See, e.g., NEW CHRISTIAN POLITICS (D. Bromby & A. Shupe ed. 1984), THE
NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT: MOBILIZATION AND LEGITIMATION (R. Liebman, R. Wuthnow,
& J. Guth ed. 1983), A SHUPE & W. STACEY, BORN AGAIN POLITICS AND THE MORAL
MAJORITY: WHAT SOCIAL SURVERYS REALLY SHOW (1982).
approach to the Movement.
Likewise, the place of sanctuary is afforded careful treatment. In
historic sanctuary, reverence for God's place, for the numinous qual-
ities of the spot, dictated special handling. In the American context,
this respect for the physical church issues from two main fonts. First,
the significance of the place derives from individual citizens accord-
ing it religious meaning. The protected religious rights of each indi-
vidual and the individuals collectively as a congregation make the
place privileged: a place's privilege derives not from the fact that it
is dedicated to God but from the dignity of those citizens so dedicat-
ing. In American jurisprudence, the source of the power of the sanc-
tuary place lies in persons' Constitutional rights, not in the indwell-
ing presence of, or the spot's commitment to, the divine. This is a
fundamental shift from historic sanctuary with its emphasis on the
objective reality of a supernatural claim over a place to the emphasis
on the believer's belief privileging the spot. The subjective spiritual
view of the citizen as to the religious significance of the ecclesiastical
building heightens the importance of the structure and triggers First
Amendment protection.
The Fourth Amendment provides additional protection for reli-
gious buildings.1 14 The courts have enforced the Fourth Amendment
as a major safeguard of individual privacy. The Sanctuary Move-
ment's buildings possess this protection. The religious nature and
purpose of those gathering makes the State especially careful of in-
truding. As a result of the infiltration by government informants into
the Sanctuary churches, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has up-
held the right of the monitored churches to sue the INS on the basis
of, inter alia, the chilling effect such governmental activity has on
religious free exercise.1 "5 The place of sanctuary is accorded special
164.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things
to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. IV.
165. The government agents surreptitiously recorded church services using "body
bugs," in four churches. The churches sued the government claiming, inter alia, that this
caused participation in the church, and support for the church, to decline. The court
concluded that a claim under the First Amendment had been asserted, stating "[w]hen
congregants are chilled from participating in worship activities, when they refuse to at-
tend church services because they fear the government is spying on them and taping their
every utterance,. . . we think a church suffers. . . injury because its ability to carry out
its ministeries has been impaired."
In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied on Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465
(1987). The court determined that in Keene, the plaintiff had stated a cause of action by
alleging that government action had influenced his constituency against him, which made
it more difficult for the plaintiff to continue in his political career.
The court distinguished Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), where the plaintiffs al-
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consideration under both the First and Fourth Amendment aegis.
The third aspect of historic sanctuary which resonates in the Sanc-
tuary Movement is its role as check on the State. Historic sanctuary
stood between the pursuer and the pursued. It prevented summary
violence and pressed for fair treatment. This action did not consti-
tute civil disobedience because the State recognized the Church as a
valid political entity with concomitant powers. Sanctuary supported
and improved the development of a rational, regulated criminal jus-
tice system. It was not against the government but called for a bet-
ter, that is, more just, State.
American civil disobedience is the conscious act of violating the
law of the land due to personal conviction that it is unjust, and then
the acceptance of legitimate punishment. The Sanctuary defendants
do not claim to be such dissenters; rather, they contend that they are
acting within the legal system and accuse the INS of not following
the law. As in historic sanctuary, the Sanctuary Movement is
reproaching the government and its agents. It demands that they
play by the established rules and obey the law. The rules say no one
with a well-founded fear of persecution may be deported regardless
of whether or not the Administration backs the alien's home govern-
ment. The Sanctuary Movement stands between the pursuing INS
agents who summarily deport captured aliens and the alien in
Church protection. As historic sanctuary was a part of the national
system, so too the Sanctuary Movement claims to be. It reproaches
the government for not acting with justice. The public position of
mainline churches has called into question the Administration's Cen-
tral American policy and the enforcement of immigration laws by
spotlighting the plight of the aliens and the government's deportation
treatment. From the deplorable mass detention camps to bugging
churches, the Sanctuary Movement has discredited the government
and stimulated a generally complacent citizenry to contemplate the
issues.
The Sanctuary Movement is a powerful force, not because of the
comparatively small numbers of Central Americans it actually helps,
but because it focuses the nation's attention on a profoundly dis-
turbing situation: the loss of control of the Mexican border, the en-
leged only that the mere existence of the Army's domestic surveillance of peaceful civil-
ian political activity chilled the exercise of their First Amendment rights. The court
stated that Laird was not controlling because there the plaintiffs had failed to allege that
the Army had actually engaged in surveillance of the plaintiffs, as opposed to the instant
case, where the government had actually engaged in surveillance of the church services.
The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. U.S., 870 F.2d 518, 520-23 (9th Cir. 1989).
forcement of the immigration laws, the plight of Central American
immigrants, America's role in their native lands, the INS treatment
of the aliens. All these issues are highlighted by the vocal, main-
stream religious congregations involved in the Sanctuary Movement.
In short, the Sanctuary Movement carries on the mission of histori-
cal sanctuary to provide a check on the government.
Whether the spate of court challenges will impact immigration
policy or religious freedom is yet to be determined; it is clear, how-
ever, that the Sanctuary Movement is very much a scion of historical
sanctuary. As usual in the United States, the ancient elements -
person, place, and government check - have been recast in accor-
dance within the American vision and context, resulting in a new
embodiment of sanctuary. It remains to be seen if and how the coun-
try will incorporate the Sanctuary Movement into its legal and polit-
ical framework, but it has already fulfilled its age-old function of
calling the State to reconsider its policies and actions regarding Cen-
tral American undocumented aliens. By interposing the Church be-
tween the agents of the government and the fleeing alien, hopefully a
more just system will continue to evolve.
